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Abstract
In his insightful editorial, Nir Eyal explores the connections between nudging and shaming. One upshot of his 
argument is that we should question the principle of the least restrictive alternative in public health and health policy. 
In this commentary, I maintain that Eyal’s argument undermines only a rather implausible version of the principle of 
the least restrictive alternative and I sketch two reasons for rejecting the mainstream and more plausible version of 
this principle.
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In his insightful editorial (1), Nir Eyal explores the connections between nudging and shaming. He makes four claims:
• Some nudges deliberately harness the power of shame.
• Other nudges generate shame as an unintended side
effect.
• When we can predictably anticipate that a nudge
will generate shame as an unintended side effect, it is
preferable to select a more restrictive alternative than to
unnecessarily expose individuals to shame.
• The Principle of the Least Restrictive Alternative
(hereafter, PLRA) is objectionable.
I could take issue with the first claim, which depends on how 
nudges and shame are respectively defined. Although Socrates 
made himself quite a name discussing definitions, I here refrain 
from my professional taste for hair splitting. Instead, here, I take 
issue with Eyal’s last point. Eyal’s argument undermines only a 
rather implausible version of PLRA. But there are reasons for 
rejecting the mainstream version of this principle that I sketch 
in this commentary.
Public health and health policy issues are rarely due to a single 
tractable and alterable cause and are notoriously difficult to 
address. Even partial solutions often require using the law, 
making regulations, mobilizing complex social institutions, and 
changing the behavior of a plurality of agents (from individuals 
to corporations). If proven efficacious and effective, nudges are 
part of the regulatory toolbox, nothing more, nothing less. As 
Eyal notes, nudges have been defined as interventions based on 
insights from behavioral economics that “influence decisions 
while preserving freedom of choice” (2). The claim that nudges 
preserve freedom of choice plays a crucial role in the argument 
in favor of preferring nudges to interventions more restrictive 
of individual freedoms. Eyal implicitly attacks the following 
argument:
Premise 1: If two interventions can both efficaciously and 
effectively address a public health or health policy issue, the 
intervention least restrictive of personal liberties ought to be 
preferred (by PLRA).
Premise 2: Health nudges are efficacious and effective, and 
preserve freedom of choice.
Conclusion: Health nudges ought to be preferred to more 
restrictive  interventions. 
Eyal denies the conclusion because he rejects Premise 
1. According to him Premise 1 is vulnerable to several
counterexamples. Let me rehearse only one of them. This 
counterexample discusses institutional solutions to the 
problem of the allocation of trainees to patients in university 
hospitals. As the success rate of trainees is lower than that of 
trained medical personnel, some patients will be predictably 
worse-off than they would have been had they been treated by 
trained personnel. He considers two solutions to this problem:
A. An opt-out (nudge) approach: “The default is such that 
most patients will predictably forego ensuring that only 
trained personnel attends to them (partly because many 
patients and their families are too embarrassed to insist), 
but all maintain their freedom to receive services from 
trained personnel, because all would get them if they 
insisted enough” (1).
B. An impartial (non-nudge) approach: Patients would be 
allocated either to trainees or trained personnel according 
to an impartial rule, such as random lottery. “Patients who 
insist on refusing them will have to move elsewhere for 
treatment and perhaps pay steep fees” (1).
A proponent of Premise 1 would conclude that the opt-out 
(nudge) approach is preferable to the impartial (non-nudge) 
approach because it is less restrictive of personal liberties. In 
contrast, according to Eyal, the impartial approach is preferable 
to the opt-out approach because at least another morally 
relevant consideration tips the balance the other way, namely, 
the propensity of an intervention to elicit shame (minimally 
understood as embarrassment). 
Eyal argues that if A and B are two equally efficacious and 
effective interventions, and if A elicits unintended and 
undesirable shame, then B is preferable to A, although A 
might be less restrictive than B. His argument relies on two 
assumptions: the experience of shame is sometimes a morally 
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undesirable outcome; the opt-out approach counts as an 
instance of undesirable shaming. Although both claims are 
disputable and hotly disputed (3), let us grant them for the sake 
of argument.
Eyal assumes that proponents of the mainstream version of 
PLRA would disagree with him and claim that A is preferable 
to B. Is that plausible assumption? Perhaps not: Premise 1 does 
not accurately characterize the mainstream version of PLRA. 
Rather, the mainstream version of PLRA claims that A and B 
need to be equal in all morally relevant respects for the principle 
to kick in. Almost nobody claims that the moral evaluation 
of public health and health policy is restricted to their impact 
on liberty interests (and effectiveness and efficacy). There is 
broad consensus that other morally relevant considerations are 
important, including social justice and respect for the dignity 
and integrity of persons. Therefore, Eyal’s argument successfully 
defeats Premise 1 but fails to question the mainstream version 
of PLRA.
To reflect the views of most public health ethicists (4–7), 
Premise 1 should be replaced by the following, more accurate, 
premise:
Premise 1’. If two interventions can both efficaciously and 
effectively address a public health or health policy issue and 
are equal in all other morally relevant respects, the intervention 
least restrictive of personal liberties ought to be preferred (by 
PLRA).
Not only Eyal’s counterexample does not defeat Premise 1’, but 
I suspect Eyal actually endorses Premise 1’ and is therefore in 
agreement with defenders of the mainstream version of PLRA. 
In contrast, my view is that there are good reasons for rejecting 
Premise 1’. I suggest two reasons in support of the radical view 
that the mainstream version of PLRA is mistaken.
The first reason is that if we take the “all things equal” clause 
seriously, Premise 1’ is of little help. For in the real world, 
there are almost no situations in which policy-makers have to 
decide between two interventions that are equal in all morally 
relevant respects but for their impact on liberty interests, their 
effectiveness and their efficacy. Eyal’s example of the choice 
between the opt-out and the impartial approach is a case in 
point. The opt-out approach favors extraverts and “healthcare 
system smart” patients who know that if they insist they can 
have it their way, and puts those who would feel ashamed of 
asking not to be treated by a trainee at a disadvantage. The 
impartial approach is egalitarian but perhaps a bit too rigid 
and might therefore elicit feelings of frustration. Each option 
affects differently patients’ level of trust in the quality and 
fairness of the healthcare system; and so on and so forth. PLRA 
is not problematic because it excludes all moral considerations 
but those centered on liberty interests, as Eyal assumes. It is 
problematic because it includes them all. It can therefore rarely 
assist us in evaluating policy options: it is rarely a deal-breaker. 
But suppose partisans of the principle of PLRA could find a 
way around this objection. I would still argue that it should not 
be endorsed for a second, more fundamental, reason. 
Let me expand on the mainstream version of PLRA. According 
to its proponents all public health and health policy measures 
(laws, regulations, policies) have to pass a rigorous test: they 
are impermissible unless public authorities are in a position 
to demonstrate they have selected (all things equal) the means 
least restrictive of personal liberties to achieve their objective 
(4–7). The mainstream version of PLRA is objectionable 
because it generalizes a principle of US constitutional law that 
was originally much more limited in scope—and for good moral 
and practical reasons. In US constitutional law, PLRA is meant 
to provide enhanced protection only to fundamental liberties 
and rights (6). In other words, it says that public authorities 
ought to be in a position to demonstrate that they have not 
infringed on fundamental liberties and rights in the pursuit 
of their public welfare objective without compelling reasons. 
Because running through all the predictable consequences of 
feasible alternatives is not an easy task and because the least 
restrictive alternative is not always the easiest or least costly 
to implement, the requirement does not and should not apply 
when the state interferes with nonfundamental liberties. 
Obviously, a lot relies on the possibility of distinguishing 
fundamental from nonfundamental liberties. But even if the 
borders of what counts as a fundamental liberty are fuzzy and 
debatable, there are clear-cut cases. For example, according to 
all major traditions in moral and political philosophy, freedom 
of movement is a fundamental liberty that should only be 
overridden in exceptional circumstances (e.g. those that 
standardly justify quarantine as a last resort); selling soft drinks 
in X-large cups is not a fundamental liberty by any stretch of the 
term. I discuss these points in greater detail elsewhere (7–9). 
In sum, I concur with Eyal’s view that PLRA is questionable, 
but do not believe he has offered reasons for rejecting the 
mainstream version of this principle. In this comment, I have 
sketched such an argument. The hope is that our exchange will 
open up a much-needed debate over the moral foundations 
and the scope of application of PLRA. 
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